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Notes
AUTOMOBILES - COMMUNITY MISSION - BURDEN OF PROOF
Plaintiff sued to recover for damage to his automobile re-
sulting from a collision with a truck driven by defendant's wife.
Defendant was not present at the time of the accident. Plaintiff
did not allege or prove defendant's wife to have been on a mis-
sion for the community at the time of the accident,' and no evi-
dence of any nature was tendered on behalf of the defendant.
A judgment for the plaintiff was reversed by the court of ap-
peal. 2 On certiorari to the Louisiana Supreme Court, held,
affirmed. In a suit against a husband for damage caused by
his wife's negligent operation of an automobile, a petition which
is devoid of an allegation that she was engaged in the service
of the community presents no cause of action. By way of dictum
the court reconciled the discordant positions3 of the courts of
appeal concerning the burden of alleging and proving a com-
munity mission. The plaintiff will have discharged his burden
if he alleges the wife was on a community mission, proves actual
or implied consent to her use of the community car by the hus-
band, and establishes her negligence. Because of his peculiar
knowledge of the facts, the husband then must assume the
burden of showing that the wife was not on a community mis-
sion. Martin v. Brown, 124 So.2d 904 (La. 1960).
The increased use of the family automobile by insolvent mem-
bers of the family for their own purposes posed a serious prob-
lem for the American courts in the early decades of this century.4
1. Plaintiff also failed to allege that the driver of defendant's car was de-
fendant's wife. The Supreme Court was made aware of this fact only because
she was referred to by counsel and in the opinion of the court of appeal as de-
fendant's wife. Martin v. Brown, 124 So.2d 904, 906 (La. 1960).
2. There appears to be some question as to the res judicata effect of this judg-
ment, which was reinstated by the Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court
in its opinion indicates that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action, the
court of appeal made no mention that the defendant raised an exception of no
cause of action. In fact the language used by the court of appeal seems par-
ticularly final: "It Is Now Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that there be judg-
ment in favor of defendant, Ernest Brown, rejecting the demands of plaintiff,
Robert L. Martin, and dismissing his suit, at his cost." Martin v. Brown, 117
So.2d 665, 666 (La. App. 1960).
3. Certiorari was granted because of this conflict. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 11.
4. See Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50
COLUm. L. REv. 300 (1950) ; McCall, The Family Automobile, 8 N.C.L. REV. 256
(1930) ; McNiece & Thornton, Automobile Accident Prevention and Compensation,
27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 585 (1952) ; Smith, Lilly & Dowling, Compensation for Auto-
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Many innocent victims of careless driving went uncompensated,
although the owners of the cars involved were financially able
to have borne the loss.5 To remedy this inequitable situation a
substantial number of common law jurisdictions developed the
family purpose doctrine, which is designed to make the provider
of an automobile who consents to its use by members of his
family liable for their negligent driving.6 In Louisiana this
doctrine was not adopted 7 perhaps because the code provision s
for vicarious parental liability for the delicts of the minor pro-
vided a large measure of the protection offered by the common
law device.9 Furthermore, the family purpose doctrine is in-
consistent with the general Louisiana'0 and French civilian"
mobile Accidents, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 785 (1932) ; Report of Committee To Study
Compensation for Auto Accidents, Colum. U. Council for Research in the Social
Sciences (1932) ; Financial Protection for the Motor Accident Victim, 3 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROn. No. 4 (1936).
5. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1420, § 26.15 (1956). E.g., Durso v. Cozzo-
lino, 128 Conn. 24, 20 A.2d 392 (1941) ; Richardson v. True, 259 S.W.2d 70 (Ky.
1953); Jacobsen v. Dailey, 228 Minn. 201, 36 N.W.2d 711 (1949) ; King v.
Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 204 S.W. 296 (1918).
6. See PROSSER, TORTS § 66 (2d ed. 1955) ; Lattin, Vicarious Liability and the
Family Automobile, 26 Micr. L. REV. 846 (1928) ; Note, 16 NOTRE DAME LAW.
394 (1941). See also, e.g., leading cases embracing the doctrine: Griffin v. Rus-
sell, 144 Ga. 275, 87 S.E. 10 (1915) ; Kayser v. Van Nest, 125 Minn. 277, 146
N.W. 1091 (1914) ; King v. Smythe, 140 Tenn. 217, 204 S.W. 296 (1918) ; Birch
v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486, 133 Pac. 1020 (1913).
7. See Martin v. Brown, 124 So.2d 904 (La. 1960); Adams v. Golson, 187
La. 363, 174 So. 876 (1937) ; Benton v. Griffith, 184 So. 371 (La. App. 1938) ;
Tuck v. Harmon, 151 So. 803 (La. App. 1934) ; Davis v. Shaw, 142 So. 301 (La.
App. 1932) ; Globe Indemnity Co. v. Quesenberry, 1 La. App. 364 (1924).
8. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2318 (1870). See Employer's Fire Ins. Co. v. Vincent,
52 So.2d 90 (La. App. 1951) ; Ilingle v. Ahten, 43 So.2d 550 (La. App. 1950) ;
Honeycutt v. Carver, 25 So.2d 99 (La. App. 1946) ; Dudley v. Surles, 11 So.2d
70 (La. App. 1942) ; Savoie v. Walker, 183 So. 530 (La. App. 1938) ; Balsamo
v. Hall, 170 So. 402 (La. App. 1936) ; Stortz v. New Orleans Public Service,
141 So. 814 (La. App. 1932) ; Nelms v. Boswell, 17 La. App. 480, 136 So. 146
(1931) ; Whipple v. Lirette, 11 La. App. 485, 124 So. 160 (1929) ; Stout v. Lewis,
11 La. App. 503, 123 So. 346 (1929).
9. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1949-1950 Term -
Torts, 11 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 186, 190 (1951). Cf. Note, 6 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 478 (1945).
10. Adams v. Golson, 187 La. 363, 174 So. 876 (1937) ; McClure v. McMartin,
104 La. 496, 29 So. 227 (1901) ; Durel v. Flach, 1 La. App. 758 (1925).
11. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1384 et seq. (transl. by Cachard, 1930). See 39
DALLOZ, JURISPRUDENCE GAINI RALE 420 (1858) : "In principle, the husband is not
at all responsible for the delicts and quasi-delicts of his wife; such a responsibility
shall not exist except by virtue of an express provision: article 1384 does not
contain one. Also, during the community, the penalties incurred by the wife can
be executed only upon the personal estate of which she has the bare ownership;
(c. nap. 1424.) evidently, it is to be the same way with her debt for damages.
From which it follows that the husband is not responsible, otherwise he would be
personally bound and the community with him.- Such was the acknowledged
rule in the old law (Pothier, commun., no 256; Lebrun, Commun., liv. 2, ch. 2,
sect. 3, n0 7).-The modern commentators are interpreted only in this sense
... and the jurisprudence is equally consistent with this doctrine." (Translation
by writer.)
See POTHIER, OBLIGATION, pt. II, C. VI, § VIII, p. 338 (transl. LeBrun, 1802)
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rule that the husband is not liable for the torts of his wife com-
mitted out of his presence. Nevertheless, there appears to have
been some dissatisfaction with a situation which left the family
assets free from a claim for the careless driving of the wife.12
In Adams v. GolsonI3 this gap was partly closed by the intro-
duction of the community mission doctrine, which is based on
the idea that the community is liable for the torts of the wife
committed when she is using the community automobile in
acting as an agent for the community. 14 However, the Supreme
"Another kind of accessory obligation is that of heads of families who are respon-
sible for the torts of their minor children and wives, not preventing them when
they had it in their power to do so.
"They are holden to have it in their power to prevent the tort when it was
committed in their presence. If it was committed in their absence, we are to
judge from circumstances, whether they had it in their power to prevent it."
See 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISE TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1105 (1959).
12. Tarleton-Gaspard v. Malochee, 133 So. 409 (La. App. 1931) (wife in
driving her mother, father, and sister to the movie was found to have been acting
as husband's agent although the husband had only given general consent to use
the automobile which was his separate property). See Paderas v. Stauffer, 10
La. App. 50, 120 So. 886 (1929), which appears to present the first expression
of the community errand idea. Here the husband was liable for the negligence
of his wife committed while driving her own car. The burden of proof was on
the husband to show that she had been on a mission for her separate benefit. He
failed to discharge this burden and the evidence pointed the other way: "[T]he
evidence shows ... that she was shopping. If she was shopping for the household
she was on a community errand, and if she was engaged in selecting clothes, or
hats, or any of the numberless things a woman requires for her own comfort or
adornment, then, likewise, she was on a community errand, and in either such
event she was just as much the agent of her husband as head and master of the
community as would have been the family chauffeur."
See also Battalora v. Carnahan Creamery, 157 So. 612 (La. App. 1934),
where the husband was liable for injuries to a guest resulting from collision
brought about through the wife's negligence. The opinion did not reveal the nature
of the wife's business at the time of the accident, but merely quoted language from
the Tarleton-Gaspard case.
13. 187 La. 363, 174 So. 876 (1937).
14. The rationale may be described thusly: (1) there is no tort liability in
this state except that predicated upon articles of the Civil Code; (2) Article 2317
imposes liability for the damage occasioned by the act of persons for whom we
are answerable; (3) the husband is not liable for the torts of his wife committed
out of his presence (McClure v. McMartin, 104 La. 496, 29 So. 227 (1901));
(4) the owner of an automobile is not liable for the damages caused by its bor-
rower unless he was present or the borrower was acting as his agent (Atkins v.
Points, 148 La. 958, 88 So. 231 (1921)) ; (5) under Louisiana Civil Code Article
2403 the husband is head and master of the community and under the jurisprudence
the wife is without authority to contract a debt that will bind the community
except for necessities (Schaffer v. Trascher, 165 La. 315, 115 So. 575 (1928)) ;
(6) however, Louisiana Civil Code Article 2985 provides that an agency may
exist for the interest of the principal, that of both agent and principal, that of a
third person, and that of any other combination of two of the three parties men-
tioned; but the agency may not be created for the benefit of the mandatary or
agent alone (10 DURANTON, COURS DE DROIT FRANCAIS 64, no 200 (1834));
(7) therefore, to hold the husband liable as head of the community for the wife's
torts, it must be shown affirmatively that she was expressly or impliedly au-
thorized to and was, at the time of the commission of the act, actually attending
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Court's application of the rule in that case narrowly constrained
the meaning of the term community mission. The wife who
negligently injured a motorcyclist with the family car while on
an out-of-town visit for the purpose of attending a style show
and a fraternal meeting was held not to have been on a com-
munity mission but merely to have been engaged in a trip for
her own pleasure. Subsequent court of appeal cases seemed to
envision the community as a business concern and apparently
interpreted this ruling to mean that only missions resulting in
a "business" expense or a financial gain to the community would
be counted as a community errand. 15 However, in Brantley v.
Clarkson'6 the Supreme Court enlarged the community mission
concept to include any legitimate pursuit of the wife while using
the community automobile. 17 The court reasoned that since the
community owed the wife pleasure and recreation as well as
food and clothing, a pleasure trip may properly be considered
to be for a community purpose.
Prior to its adoption by the Supreme Court, the Orleans
to the affairs or business of the community (Adams v. Golson, 187 La. 363, 370,
371, 174 So. 876, 878, 879 (1937)).
15. Lambert v. McKinster, 44 So.2d 513 (La. App. 1950) (no community
mission where the wife, after a quarrel with her husband, drove the car to town
to regain composure, bought cosmetics and window-shopped, and negligently caused
collision on returning home) ; Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Simms, 200 So. 34
(La. App. 1941) (wife en route to shop to get ignition switch repaired prepara-
tory to taking trip to visit sick aunt); Wise v. Smith, 186 So. 857 (La. App.
1939) (although the thrust of the opinion is aimed at lack of husband's consent
to use car, the court specifically stated that wife's visit to sick mother-in-law was
not a community mission) ; Matulich v. Crockett, 184 So. 748 (La. App. 1938)
(wife's charitable activities were not community purpose because the alms she
distributed were not supplied by the community and the husband objected to her
activity).
16. 217 La. 425, 46 So.2d 614 (1950). The Supreme Court, one Justice dis-
senting, quoted with approval from the court of appeal opinion expressing the
court's personal view which was contrary to its reluctant rejection of the plain-
tiff's demand: "Were this question res nova before this court on the facts
presented it would be our inclination . .,. that the legitimate pursuits of a wife,
whether for wholesale recreation and pleasure or for other purposes consonant
with the intangible and imponderable obligations of the marital relationship should
be considered as within the scope of community activities." Id. at 432, 46 So.2d
at 616.
17. In Vail v. Spampinato, 238 La. 259, 115 So.2d 343 (1959), the court
followed its ruling in the Brantley case, supra note 16, by finding that a wife who
maintained she had undertaken a trip to obtain "pocket money" had engaged in a
community mission because the trip was partially for her enjoyment and pleasure.
It is interesting to note that the court in the instant case made no mention of this
case whatsoever. Perhaps this may be explained by the Vail opinion's limited
interpretation of the Brantley decision: "[It] enlarged the scope of community
activities by including therein the recreation and pleasure of the wife." Obviously,
the inclusion of the wife's pleasure and recreational jaunts alone would not amount
to the same thing as enlargement of the community mission concept to include
all "legitimate pursuits" of the wife, which is the view taken in the instant case.
Martin v. Brown, 124 So.2d 904, 907 (La. 1960).
NOTES
Court of Appeal had, in essence, applied the community pur-
pose doctrine and had placed the burden of proving an absence
of a community mission squarely on the husband who sought
to escape liability. 18 However, the Supreme Court, in the Adams
case, held that it must be "shown affirmatively" that the wife
was on a community errand in order to hold the husband liable.' 9
The Second Circuit Court of Appeal subsequently relied on this
statement in reversing judgments against husbands where the
plaintiffs had failed to allege or prove a community mission,20
but the First and Orleans Circuits adhered to the rule fashioned
in the early court of appeal cases.2'
The instant case held that the plaintiff, in order to state a
cause of action, must allege that the wife was driving the auto-
mobile on a community mission at the time of her negligent act.
In a dictum statement, which is the Louisiana Supreme Court's
first clear expression on the matter, the court seems to have
adopted the view of the Orleans and First Circuit Courts of
Appeal as to the burden of proving a community mission. If
the plaintiff succeeds in establishing the wife's negligence in
a community car and the husband's express or implied consent
to her use of the vehicle, the defendant husband must prove that
she was not on a community mission in order to escape liability.
This rule appears to be in line with the body of jurisprudence
regarding the master's liability for the negligent driving of his
servant 22 and also appears to move Louisiana nearer to a posi-
18. Paderas v. Stauffer, 10 La. App. 50, 119 So. 757 (1929). This case
appears to be the only reported account of a husband being held liable for his
wife's negligent operation of her own automobile.
19. Adams v. Golson, 187 La. 363, 371, 174 So. 876, 879 (1937).
20. Martin v. Brown, 117 So.2d 665 (La. App. 1959); Hart v. Hardgrave,
103 So.2d 910, on rehearing, 916 (La. App. 1958). Cf. Tuck v. Harmon, 151 So.
803 (La. App. 1934), where plaintiff alleged that the wife was on a community
mission, but failed to allege any facts in support of this proposition.
Perhaps this view was engendered to some extent by the Brantley case, supra
note 15, which not only found that the Adams case had correctly stated the law,
but which also enlarged the husband's ambit of liability. The Second Circuit might
have felt this in addition to a prima facie case on the issue of community mission
to be too favorable to the plaintiff in a community errand case.
21. Johnson v. Delta Fire & Casualty Co., 110 So.2d 215 (La. App. 1959)
Howard v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 70 So.2d 465 (La. App. 1954). 0f. Levy
v. New Orleans & N.E.R.R., 20 So.2d 559 (La. App. 1945). In this case the
husband sued for damage to his automobile and wrongful death of his wife re-
sulting from a car-train collision. Even though the husband was the plaintiff in
this case the court held he had the burden of proving absence of a community
mission in order to counteract the wife's contributory negligence posed as a defense
by the railroad.
22. See cases holding that the owner of an automobile who consents to its
use by another is not made liable for the driver's negligence unless he is present,
or the driver is acting as his agent, at the time of accident. Tinker v. Hirst, 162
1961]
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tion of accord with the common law family purpose doctrine.
With the adoption of the presumption 23 that the wife using the
community automobile with the consent of her husband is on a
community errand, it would seem that the Louisiana plaintiff
is now required actually to prove no more than is necessary
under the family purpose doctrine.2 4 This appears to be har-
monious with the true basis of the community mission doctrine,2 5
which in turn seems consistent with a general legislative policy
of providing adequate protection for the victims of automobile
mishaps. 28
James L. Dennis
La. 209, 110 So. 324 (1926) (employer not liable where employee drove truck
without consent on Sunday) ; Atkins v. Points, 148 La. 958, 88 So. 231 (1921)
(lessor of automobile not liable for negligence of his lessee) ; Anderson v. Carrick,
198 So. 385 (La. App. 1940) (pleasure ride in mother-in-law's automobile);
Hadrick v. Burbank Cooperage Co., 177 So. 831 (La. App. 1938) (employee bor-
rowed employer's truck for personal use) ; Lyle v. Guillot, 143 So. 511 (La. App.
1932) (young man at night club borrowed friend's car to take girl for a ride) ;
Vuillemot v. August J. Claverie & Co., 125 So. 168 (La. App. 1929) (employee
driving for own pleasure).
But where the plaintiff establishes ownership in the defendant and employ-
ment of the driver by the defendant, the defendant has the burden of proving
that the driver was not acting within the scope of employment: See, e.g., Cofield
v. Burgdolf, 238 La. 297, 115 So.2d 357 (1959); May v. Yellow Cab Co., 164
La. 920, 114 So. 836 (1927) ; Harding v. Christiana, 103 So.2d 301 (La. App.
1958); Simms v. Lawrence Bros., 72 So.2d 538 (La. App. 1954); Futch v.
Horace Williams Co., 26 So.2d 776 (La. App. 1946) ; Culver v. Toye Bros. Yellow
Cab Co., 26 So.2d 296 (La. App. 1946) ; Murphy v. Henderson, 23 So.2d 369 (La.
App. 1945) ; Movales v. Burns, 21 So.2d 893 (La. App. 1945).
23. The court's reason for establishing the presumption was the probable
existence of special knowledge of the facts in the husband. A better reason would
appear to be the likelihood that the wife is engaged in a legitimate pursuit, which
under the Brantley case is the sole requisite characteristic of a community mission.
24. See 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 26.15 (1956) ; PROSSER, TORTS 369
(1955).
25. Since the need for the community mission doctrine, like that of the family
purpose doctrine, was created by negligent automobile operation, it would seem
reasonable to assume that the doctrine's operation will be restricted to automobile
cases. If this assumption is correct, then the presumption that the wife's mission
is for the benefit of the community should not be available outside this area of
litigation.
Nevertheless, lower courts have discussed the wife's acts as agent of the com-
munity in cases involving tort claims in other areas. See Moses v. Metropolitan
Cas. Ins. Co., 51 So.2d 830 (La. App. 1951) (wife who caused light to be turned
out on stairway in order to pursue hobby of photography thereby causing tenant
who was descending stairs to fall, was not acting as agent of community) ; Reneau
v. Brown, 158 So. 406 (La. App. 1928) (wife cannot be sued for harboring vicious
dog without joining husband, as this is a community act). Cf. decisions in juris-
dictions which have adopted the family car doctrine, holding that it has no applica-
tion to motorboats or motorcycles. Felcyn v. Gamble, 185 Minn. 357, 241 N.W.
37 (1932) ; Meinhardt v. Vaughn, 159 Tenn. 272, 17 S.W.2d 5 (1929). See Note,
16 MINN. L. REV. 870 (1932).
26. See LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950) (liability insurance omnibus clause require-
ment) ; id. 32:851 (Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law).
